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Abstract
Electricity market liberalization is altering the pricing mechanisms for wholesale elec-
tricity and thus the links between generation costs and user prices. This will aﬀect the
eﬀectiveness of climate and energy policies. In this paper, we simulate a tightening of
these policies under the alternative regulatory assumptions of (1) continued cost-plus price
regulation and (2) gradual market liberalization. For these simulations, we developed a
modeling framework composed of a technology-rich model of electricity generation and
an applied computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The first is used to minimize
generation costs, the second to compute equilibrium prices and quantities. The two mod-
els are soft-linked by relating these costs and prices, whereby the relationship between
costs and prices depends precisely on the regulatory assumption. Using this framework,
we find, for Switzerland, that a tax on electricity is more eﬀective in reducing electricity
demand in a liberalized market than under cost-plus regulation.
⇤Corresponding author: sophie.maire@epfl.ch
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1 Introduction
Price formation depends on market structure and regulation. Traditionally, wholesale electric-
ity prices were regulated to allow producers to cover their generation costs and achieve an
acceptable profit. Such price regulation provides incentives for new capacity additions as firms
are guaranteed an acceptable return on investment. Moreover, investment into new capacity
may additionally be fostered with the help of diﬀerent types of subsidies, whether open or
covert. In a fully liberalized competitive market, wholesale electricity is priced at marginal cost.
This provides no incentive for investment unless there is scarcity, in which case the wholesale
price includes a scarcity rent1, which, in equilibrium, provides incentive for investment into new
capacities (International Energy Agency, 2001).
The current European wholesale electricity market can be described as a largely liberalized
market with overcapacity. Wholesale electricity is increasingly priced at short-term marginal
cost. However, this price is currently too low to provide incentive for investment into new
capacity2. In a liberalized market, such incentive will emerge only as expected prices reflect
new capacity needs through scarcity rents at the margin. Today, it is yet unclear whether
markets will be fully liberalized or whether elements of central planning will reappear out of the
fear of undesired consequences of scarce capacity such as outages and price spikes.
The impacts of changing regulatory environments on price formation are potentially relevant
for the eﬀectiveness of energy and climate policies. They must, therefore, be modeled carefully.
An adequate way of modeling electricity markets is to couple bottom-up and top-down models
to take advantage of the qualities of both model types: The bottom-up model provides a
detailed set of electricity generation technologies and minimizes generation costs, while the
top-down model simulates the interactions between economic agents and computes equilibrium
prices and quantities. For their coupling, many approaches have been developed since Hoﬀman
and Jorgenson, 1977, each with its strengths and weaknesses (for a review of the methods, see
e.g. Böhringer and Rutherford, 2009). Few studies explicitly link costs from bottom-up models
to prices in CGE models. Amongst the studies that do, diﬀerent assumptions are made:
• Fortes et al., 2014 link total energy costs (average cost) variation from TIMES-Portugal
to energy prices in GEM-E3 Portugal.
• Martinsen, 2011 couples MARKAL Norway and the MSG6 CGE model, linking electricity
marginal cost (weighted annual average) to wholesale electricity price.
• Riekkola et al., 2013 link the shadow price (marginal cost) of electricity from TIMES-
Sweden to the electricity price in their CGE model. They note that the price issue is not
fully resolved.
In fact, the link between costs and prices depends on the regulation. This paper inves-
tigates whether assuming diﬀerent market evolutions, and therefore diﬀerent price formation
mechanisms, has an important implication on the results when modeling electricity markets
and their interaction with the rest of the economy under climate and energy policies.
1For simplification purposes and in line with the scope of our models, we do not consider here transmission
constraints, load ranges nor network externalities. Nonetheless, the general argument remains valid.
2For example, a study from the Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy (UVEK/BFE, 2013) deems 24 out of 25
potential future hydro projects not viable due to low wholesale electricity prices. The average discounted cost
of new hydro plants is estimated at 141 CHF/MWh, which is considerably higher than the production costs of
older plants or current average wholesale prices.
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We build a coupled framework designed to analyze electricity markets and trade in Switzer-
land. This framework consists of two component models: a TIMES electricity supply model of
Switzerland - CROSSTEM-CH - and a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
- GENESwIS - of the Swiss economy. These two models are coupled through a soft link
methodology such that each model keeps its full structure and coherence and the particular
strengths of each model are used to inform the other model.
The translation of variables between two fundamentally diﬀerent models represents a chal-
lenge: The main diﬃculty comes from the fact that the TIMES electricity supply model yields
costs of electricity generation, whereas the CGE model uses wholesale electricity prices. More-
over, prices are the main drivers of the CGE model and have a direct impact on the electricity
demand that is reinserted as input to the TIMES model.
We analyze a climate policy scenario for Switzerland under two diﬀerent market assumptions
requiring two diﬀerent coupling approaches: (1) a fully regulated market, where wholesale
electricity is priced such that it equals the average cost of electricity production plus a markup,
and (2) a progressive evolution to a fully liberalized market, in which the marginal cost of
electricity production including scarcity rents defines the price of wholesale electricity.
We show that the way in which costs are linked to prices, and therefore the market evolution
expectations, have a sizable impact on the results. Notably, we observe a variation of the
reduction in electricity demand induced by the same climate and energy policies.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the two models and the coupling
approaches. Section 3 defines the scenarios. Section 4 identifies the mechanisms at work to
understand the results presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Framework
We build a coupled bottom-up top-down framework that consists of two models: the technology-
rich bottom-up model Cross Border TIMES Electricity Model (CROSSTEM-CH), and the dy-
namic multi-sectoral Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model (GENESwIS) of the Swiss
economy. These two models are coupled through an iterative soft link, where
• the electricity generation production function in the CGE model is determined by the
cost structure optimized by the bottom-up model;
• the sectoral electricity demand variations that occur in the CGE as a result of changes
in prices, as well as factor and intermediate input price variations are sent back to the
bottom-up model.
Before describing the coupling method, we shortly introduce the two models.
2.1 Models
2.1.1 Bottom-up model: CROSSTEM-CH
The Cross Border TIMES Electricity Model (CROSSTEM)3 is a technology rich bottom-up
optimization model of the electricity system in Switzerland and its four neighboring countries
3Developed by the Energy Economics Group at the Laboratory for Energy Systems Analysis (LEA), Paul
Scherrer Institute (PSI), Switzerland.
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developed on the basis of the TIMES framework. TIMES is a perfect foresight model that,
given a comprehensive set of technologies, allows users to minimize the cost of the tech-
nology mix over the time horizon, matching a given demand and taking into account a set
of constraints (Loulou et al., 2005). It displays a high level of technological detail includ-
ing operational and maintenance costs, investment costs, fuel costs, lifetime, construction
time, renewable potential and decommissioning. CROSSTEM was developed from the existing
STEM-E model described in Kannan and Turton, 2011. CROSSTEM’s time slices are dis-
aggregated to take into account the variability of electricity demand across the day (hourly),
diﬀerent types of day (weekday, Saturday, Sunday) and seasons. For the analysis in this paper,
we use the Swiss module of the CROSSTEM model (CROSSTEM-CH), where trade with the
neighboring countries is exogenous.
2.1.2 Top-down model: GENESwIS
GENESwIS is a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Swiss economy
designed to analyze energy and environmental policies (Vöhringer, 2012).
In GENESwIS, agents act rationally and are forward-looking over the time horizon 2010-
2050. Households maximize utility under given preferences and a budget constraint. Firms
maximize profit under given production technologies and perfect competition. The Government
collects taxes to provide public goods. Domestic and foreign goods are assumed to be imperfect
substitutes (Armington, 1969). Non-satiation in consumption implies that demand must equal
supply in all markets under flexible positive prices.
The energy sector is disaggregated to allow for energy and environmental policy analy-
sis. Non-energy industries are separated into aggregates taking into account their possible
importance in the formation of capital for the electricity sector and their aﬃliation to diﬀerent
CO2 taxation schemes (ETS, CO2 tax). The electricity sector has been split into ’Electricity
Generation’ and ’Electricity Transport and Distribution’ to permit the diﬀerentiation between
wholesale electricity and retail electricity prices.
Capital is modeled as putty-clay. Thus, capital invested into one sector (industry, services
or electricity) cannot be transformed into capital for another sector.
2.2 Coupling
The "soft link" coupling method (Wene, 1996), involves keeping the models’ full structure
and complexity, exchanging a chosen set of variables and solving the models iteratively until
convergence is reached on a given criterion. It has the advantage of allowing the use of
detailed and complex models, which we deem important for an analysis of the impact of
climate and energy policies on the electricity sector and the entire economy. It permits for
the representation of the electricity sector’s interaction with the other sectors of the economy
(Schäfer and Jacoby, 2005), and allows for diﬀerent types of policies to be adequately modeled:
market instruments in the CGE model and technology standards in the bottom-up model.
Coupling through a soft link prioritizes the strengths of each model: The electricity genera-
tion mix and costs from the bottom-up model are given priority over the electricity production
function of the CGE model. The latter eﬀectively becomes a Leontief function which is
parametrized with information from the latest bottom-up run. On the other hand, the endoge-
nous electricity demand reaction of the top-down model is given precedence over the initial
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demand assumption for the electricity supply model. Additionally, the variations of factor and
intermediate input price variations due to general equilibrium eﬀects modify the investment
costs, and operation and maintenance costs of the bottom-up model.
Figure 1 depicts the exchange of information between the two models. Electricity generation
costs and their components as well as export revenues and import costs are extracted from the
CROSSTEM-CH model and translated for the CGE model into a) the wholesale electricity price
and b) input shares for factors and commodities to the electricity generation cost function.
The sectoral4 electricity demand quantities simulated by the GENESwIS model are then sent
back to become inputs to the CROSSTEM-CH model. To account for changes in the economy,
factor and intermediate input prices from GENESwIS are used to modify the investment costs
and operation and maintenance costs of the diﬀerent technologies in the bottom-up model.
This sequence is iterated upon until the vector of quantities of total electricity demanded each
year converges.
electricity generation costs
CROSSTEM-CH GENESwIS
•average 
•marginal 
electricity export revenues
& import cost
input shares to electricity generation
wholesale electricity price
sectoral electricity demands
factors & intermediate input 
prices
changes to investment costs and 
operation & maintenance costs 
for electricity generation
Figure 1: Information exchange between the two component models.
The modeling framework has been set up such that the link between CROSSTEM-CH’s
generation costs and GENESWIS’ wholesale prices for electricity can be modeled in diﬀerent
ways:
4GENESwIS simulates yearly electricity demands which are distributed to each of the 288 time-slices of the
CROSSTEM-CH with the help of sectoral load curves.
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• Average cost plus pricing: The wholesale price is set at CROSSTEM-CH’s average cost
level plus a markup.
• Marginal cost pricing: CROSSTEM-CH’s marginal cost is the shadow price of the com-
modity balance and represents the increase in total system cost due to an additional unit
of demand (Loulou et al., 2005). It reflects all constraints and costs (incl. investment
cost) and can therefore be seen as a long-term marginal cost, or marginal cost including
scarcity rents for capacity. As the CGE model does not disaggregate the year into 288
time slices, the marginal cost is aggregated to an annual demand-weighted marginal cost.
To help with the convergence of the models, which is hampered by the stepwise behavior
of the bottom-up supply curve, we introduce a supply elasticity in the Electricity Transport and
Distribution sector of the CGE model. For this purpose, we insert a fixed resource at the top
of the Electricity Transport and Distribution’s nest. The elasticity of substitution between the
fixed resource and the rest of the inputs is calculated5 such that, given the share of the fixed
resource, the supply elasticity of the sector equals a selected value6 (see Rutherford, 1998).
This method was inspired by the work of Lanz and Rausch, 2011 who introduce a demand
elasticity to parameterize the bottom-up demand. They show that the choice of demand
elasticity does not aﬀect the results but that a good approximation of the top-down demand
response reduces the number of iterations needed for convergence.
Despite the introduction of a supply elasticity in the Electricity Transport and Distribution
sector of the CGE model, it is frequent for the models to lock up into an oscillation between two
marginal costs. The electricity demand oscillates between two values and does not converge.To
avoid this problem, we introduce a dampening of the demand response in the coupler: Instead
of the last electricity demand vector, we send a Gauss-Seidel combination of the CGE electricity
demands of the previous iterations (eq. 1) to the bottom-up model:
Di+1 = ↵Di + (1  ↵)Di 1 (1)
where ↵ 2 [0, 1] represents the length of the step towards the demand of the last iteration.
3 Scenarios
We simulate a baseline and a policy scenario for two diﬀerent types of electricity markets in
Switzerland: a regulated market, and progressive liberalization to a fully liberalized market (see
table 1).
The baseline (BAU) scenarios are based on the "weiter wie bisher" (i.e. "more of the
same") scenario of the Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy (Prognos and UVEK/BFE, 2012).
They include current policies such as an Emissions Trading Scheme, a CO2 tax on gas and
heating fuels for the non-ETS sectors and households, and a subsidy program for the energy
refurbishment of buildings. For each pricing scenario, the GENESwIS model is calibrated such
that the electricity demands and CO2 emissions follow the paths projected by Prognos and
UVEK/BFE, 2012.
5  = ⌘ ✓R1 ✓R with   the elasticity of substitution between the fixed resource and the rest of the inputs, ⌘
the supply elasticity and ✓R the share of the fixed resource.
6The value of supply elasticity can be set such that it helps with convergence (approximating the bottom-up
supply elasticity) as it has no impact on the results.
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Table 1: Scenarios matrix
Policy scenarios
Baseline (BAU) Tax (TAX)
Market regulation Regulated market BAU_REG TAX_REG
scenarios Liberalized market BAU_LIB TAX_LIB
The TAX scenarios represent more stringent climate and energy policies. A tax is levied
on electricity at a rate of 10% in 2020, increasing linearly to 50% in 2050. The Emissions
Trading Scheme stays identical as in the BAU scenario, but the CO2 tax on gas and heating
fuels is increased linearly from current level (60 CHF/t) to 200 CHF/t in 2050. A CO2 tax on
transport fuels is introduced at 50 CHF/t in 2035, reaching 200 CHF/t in 2050.
Under regulation (scenario REG), firms are usually allowed to cover their costs and make
an appropriate profit. We assume accordingly that electricity is priced at average cost plus a
small markup.
We assume in the liberalized market scenario (LIB) that the electricity market will be entirely
liberalized from 2025 onwards and that the price will then follow the long-term marginal cost
of the bottom-up model. From 2010 to 2025, the market is in transition and prices reflect
an increasing importance of marginal cost pricing. Profit is calculated such that the price
of wholesale electricity is pushed from the average cost given by the CROSSTEM-CH model
(AC) to the assumed market price (Pm).
Profit(t) =
Pm(t)  AC(t)
Pm(t)
(2)
We analyze the policy scenarios for the two market regulation assumptions TAX_LIB and
TAX_REG as deviations from the respective baseline scenarios BAU_LIB and BAU_REG. It
is uncommon in a CGE setting to have two diﬀerent baselines. Actually, the central targeted
baseline parameters, namely electricity demands and CO2 emissions per fuels, are the same in
both of our baselines. However, it was necessary to recalibrate the model framework under the
diﬀerent coupling mechanisms to match the targeted baseline parameters as electricity prices
are defined in a diﬀerent manner.
4 Mechanisms at work
4.1 Prices in the baseline scenarios
As mentioned above, the wholesale electricity market prices simulated in the baselines for the
two diﬀerent market regulation scenarios diverge. As can be seen in figure 2, annual average
and marginal costs for the targeted baseline demands are distinct not only in level, but also in
evolution. According to whether we assume a regulated market (REG) or a liberalized market
(LIB), the wholesale electricity prices are linked to respectively the average cost or marginal
cost of the bottom-up model. This largely specifies the level and evolution of the prices in
each market scenario (figure 2).
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Figure 2: Wholesale electricity pricing under the two baselines (LIB for the liberalized market and REG
for the regulated market) in comparison with annual average (AC) and marginal (MC) costs from the
CROSSTEM-CH model.
4.2 The eﬀects of an electricity tax
A tax on electricity consumption increases end-user prices for electricity. In equilibrium, how-
ever, this end-user prices increase does not amount exactly to the level of the tax. The reasons
are twofold:
• Electricity demand is flexible: A rise in end-user price will induce a reduction in demand.
The new equilibrium price will hence be lower than the initial price plus the tax.
• This new (and reduced) electricity demand is then passed on to the CROSSTEM-CH
model (see figure 1), which lowers electricity generation and hence alters generation
costs. As generation costs are linked to the wholesale electricity price, their alteration
will, in turn, have an eﬀect on end-user prices.
To analyze the eﬀects of an electricity tax on the electricity demand reaction and end-user
prices, we thus also need to analyze the influence of changes in demand on generation costs.
4.3 The eﬀect of demand changes on marginal and average generation
costs
Both average and marginal costs generated by the CROSSTEM-CH model include all relevant
costs, i.e. fuel costs, operation and maintenance costs, investment costs, taxes, and the
electricity trade deficit (which is usually negative for Switzerland, i.e. a trade surplus). They
both depend on the composition of the technology mix, albeit in diﬀerent ways: The marginal
cost is linked to marginal technologies, whereas the average cost depends largely on the degree
of utilization of technologies with high variable costs, such as gas-fired power plants.
Thereby, technology restrictions, or an increase in demand large enough to require the
introduction of a more expensive technology, will increase the marginal cost. Likewise, a
reduction in demand important enough to make the most expensive technology obsolete, will
decrease the marginal cost.
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For the average cost, things are more complicated, because the direction of change depends
not only on the marginal technology, but on the technology and cost structure as a whole. For
example, if the technology mix is composed mostly of technologies with high fixed costs, a
decrease in demand increases average cost. In contrast, if the technology mix includes a large
share of technologies with high variable costs, a decrease in demand also decreases average
cost.
5 Results
As we saw in the previous section, the eﬀect of an electricity tax is linked to the demand
elasticity and to the reaction of the generation costs to a variation in demand. According
to whether we assume a regulated market or a liberalized market, the wholesale electricity
prices are linked to respectively the average cost or marginal cost of the bottom-up model.
Consequently, the eﬀectiveness of the electricity tax will depend on the reaction of the marginal
cost (resp. average cost) in the liberalized (resp. regulated) market. In this section, we analyze
the eﬀectiveness of the TAX scenario policies under two diﬀerent market assumptions: gradual
liberalization (LIB) and regulation (REG). To do this, we first investigate the eﬀect of the
policies on the generation costs in the Swiss context.
5.1 Generation costs
5.1.1 Marginal cost
As can be seen in figure 3a, the marginal cost does not vary greatly for the TAX scenarios
relative to the baselines for either of the market regulation scenarios. Demand reductions under
the TAX scenarios are not large enough to shock the technology mix deeply and there are no
technology restrictions in addition to the baselines. Therefore, the marginal technologies, and
hence the marginal cost, do not change much in yearly average (although they may change in
some particular time-slices).
5.1.2 Average cost
In contrast, average cost is reduced in the TAX scenarios relative to the baselines (figure
3a). Due to a technology mix comprising many depreciated plants and to the optimized
cost structure of the CROSSTEM-CH model, variable costs represent a major share of total
cost. Furthermore, at each iteration, the investment decisions as well as running-schedules
are re-optimized over the entire time horizon of the model, which further increases the total
proportion of variable costs in the framework. A dominant share of variable costs implies that
average cost is lower when less electricity is produced.
The variation of average cost for the liberalized market (TAX_LIB) is greater than under
regulation (TAX_REG). This is due to the fact that total electricity demand is reduced further
in the liberalized market scenario than in the regulated market scenario.
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5.2 From costs to end user prices under alternative market regulation
We will now investigate what the diﬀerent responses of the marginal and average costs implies
for the wholesale, retail and end-user prices, and for electricity demand under alternative market
regulations.
5.2.1 Liberalized market
In the liberalized market scenarios, wholesale electricity prices are increasingly linked to the
marginal cost. We observe that the marginal cost is not greatly aﬀected by the demand
reduction induced by the TAX_LIB scenario (figure 3a). As a result, wholesale electricity prices
(figure 3b) are impacted only slightly. Retail electricity corresponds to electricity transported
and distributed to the users. An important share of its production cost is due to the purchase of
wholesale electricity. The prices of commodities and services constituting the remaining share
are not aﬀected greatly by the policies of the TAX_LIB scenario. Hence, retail electricity prices
vary in the same direction as wholesale electricity prices, although this variation is dampened
(figure 3b). End user prices are defined as retail prices gross of tax. The electricity tax
included in the TAX scenario increases the end user price of electricity (figure 3c), which
reduces electricity demand (figure 3d).
5.2.2 Regulated market
For the regulated market scenarios, wholesale electricity prices are closely linked to average
cost. They are therefore reduced as a result of the electricity demand reduction induced by the
energy policies, namely the electricity tax, included in the TAX_REG scenario (figures 3a&b).
Consequently, retail electricity prices also decrease relative to the baseline (figure 3b). Hence,
the end user price increase (gross of tax) is smaller in the regulated market (TAX_REG) than
in the liberalized market (TAX_LIB), as can be seen in figure 3c. The resulting reduction in
demand is therefore smaller in the regulated market than in the liberalized market7 (figure 3d).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that assumptions on the future evolution of electricity market regulation
have an impact on the eﬀectiveness of electricity taxes to curb demand. In a coupled bottom-
up top-down modeling framework, the way we translate costs into prices needs to reflect
the nature of market regulation: Assuming a more or less liberalized market implies linking
the wholesale electricity price to either the average cost or the marginal cost of electricity
generation.
The regulated market, which links wholesale electricity market prices to average costs,
is easier to model, because it avoids the numerical convergence issues stemming from the
stepwise behavior of marginal costs. However, if the market is not tightly regulated, this
linking assumption is inappropriate and leads to its misrepresentation. As a consequence, the
estimation of the eﬀectiveness of energy or climate policies is erroneous. As we have shown,
the electricity demand reduction fostered by market-based policies is stronger in a liberalized
setting than in a regulated market.
7These results are qualitatively robust to diﬀerent calibrations of the CGE model.
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(a) Average and marginal costs (b) Wholesale and retail electricity prices
(c) End user prices (gross of tax) for electricity (d) Electricity demands
Figure 3: Percentage change of - (a) average cost (AC) and marginal cost (MC), (b) wholesale and
retail electricity prices, (c) electricity prices paid by the end users (gross of tax) and retail electricity
prices (net of tax), and (d) electricity demands - for the scenarios TAX_LIB and TAX_REG compared
to the baselines BAU_LIB and BAU_REG respectively.
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Before generalizing this result, some caveats are in order. First of all, the marginal cost
assumed in our modeling framework is a demand-weighted annual average of the marginal
costs for all time slices, which is a strong simplification. In addition, we assume that electricity
generation is optimized over the full modeling horizon with perfect foresight. Finally, we make
specific, albeit representative for Switzerland, assumptions about policy changes and available
technologies. Further research is needed to explore the consequences of modified pricing
mechanisms in (partially) liberalized markets under diﬀerent national circumstances, policies
and technological options.
Notwithstanding, it is important to take ongoing and projected market liberalization into
account and to disclose pricing assumptions when interpreting coupled models’ results.
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